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Abstract 
This paper is an empirical attempt to evaluate the importance of maritime transport in North Korea. 
The study refers to port development issues in the socialist developing countries, in terms of 
constraints and advantages for ports, and proposes some analysis based on Nampo, the main 
international trading port city in North Korea. Although it faces a number of difficulties such as 
trade embargo, energy shortages, transport infrastructure dereliction and unstable diplomatic 
relationships, North Korean trade activity has been maintained. However, the participation of 
individual ports in these general trends is not well-known due to the scarcity of data. An analysis of 
cargo vessel movements at North Korean ports during the last two decades is provided, helping to 
estimate the importance of ports in foreign trade. It appears that the nature and evolution of port 
activity do not totally match either the Soviet or socialist developing country models, but 
proceeding to more on the latter. Some comparison with  foreign cases of port concentration and 
port-related industrial development allows for addressing some implications for Nampo. Finally, 
the importance of free-trade zones and connection to the transport chain is mentioned for the 
success of the North Korean gateway.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Located 40 kilometres from Pyongyang, the function of Nampo is to serve North Korea’ s core 
region, its main hinterland. However, port activities in North Korea are hampered by several 
internal and external constraints. Referring to the theory of the socialist developing countries 
explored by Jo and Adler (2002a), the question of ports combines elements of both socialist and 
developing countries. Although studies on ports in developing countries “ are few and dated”  
(Airriess, 1989), they can be compared to the North Korean case for a number of issues, such as 
port concentration, rapid port-city growth leading to lack of space and congestion, and 
cumbersome regulations (Taafe et al., 1963; Hilling, 1977; Hoyle, 1981). Port studies in socialist 
and transitioning countries are also few, but they allow for the formulation of several key issues 
such as the prevalence of railways in the modal split, the dominance of bulky products for port 
traffics and the preferential trade relationships among socialist countries (Ledger and Roe, 1996; 
Thorez, 1998; Jauernig and Roe, 2000 and 2001; Brodin, 2000 and 2003). Both models also 
emphasize the low level of modernization, illustrated by the lack of mechanical handling facilities 
(e.g. containers), and the managerial limitations resulting from political factors, such as 
bureaucracy and protectionism. Moreover, limitations of inland transportation and port hinterlands 
are a common trend of Asian ports (Ducruet and Jeong, 2005). Although the Chinese experience is 
interesting as it combines some elements of socialist regime and capitalist economy, it might not be 
fully relevant for the North Korean case, given the very dependence of Chinese industries on the 
Hong Kong global financial and port hub until 1995 (Wang, 1998). 
The task of this paper is to examine to what extent such factors apply to North Korea, raising the 
hypothesis that this country might produce a unique case, given its long period of isolation, tight 
diplomatic relationships with the outside world, the importance of military considerations, and the 
self-reliance ideology.  
The first section introduces Nampo and the recent North Korean reform policy, with an overlook of 
the North Korean transport system. The second section proposes an analysis of cargo vessel 
movements over the last two decades (1985-2005) at North Korean ports. It verifies the relevancy 
of Soviet and socialist developing countries's models for North Korea and notably Nampo. The 
fourth section addresses implications about the future of Nampo as the gateway of North Korea. 
Finally, concluding remarks are given about the place of North Korea in port planning studies.  
 
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF NAMPO IN NORTH KOREAN CHANGE 
2.1 Institutional change and territorial reorganization 
Several reports and studies have addressed the economical and political changes in North Korea in 
recent years, demonstrating very diverse opinions. Some authors think that many of the regime’ s 
economic changes and diplomatic manoeuvres “ may prove self-defeating”  in the long run 
(Sandhu, 2003), while others depict the reform process as “ underway and probably unstoppable
”  (Beal, 2004). 
 
2.1.1 Reforms and foreign investment 
Since the mid-1990s, North Korea has undertaken a number of actions to evolve in a context of 
crisis, which was accentuated by floods and starvation. The economic management improvement 
measures in the 1990s moved toward a reformist behavior, notably from the June 15
th
 Joint 
Declaration in 2000 between the two Koreas, and the announcement of the “ New Way of Thinking
”  in 2001. Since July 2002, the adjustment of consumer prices, wages, foreign exchange rates and 
the expansion of the autonomy of businesses have been key implements of the new policy direction. 
After March and June 2003, respectively, terms such as “ market”  and “ reform”  were officially 
recognized within the new “ practical socialism”  policy, echoing the Chinese “ market socialism
”  (Ministry of Unification in South Korea, 2005). The consequence is an increase in individual 
commercial activities (shops, stores) and the development of a family farming system, based on a 
greater self-governing power for factories and companies.  
Since the Law on Joint Ventures in 1984, some achievement in the field of foreign investment can 
be seen by the opening and operation of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, which has welcomed 
South Korean factories since 2002. Former efforts, such as the Sinuiju Special Administrative 
Region (SAR) in the North Pyongan province, close to the Chinese city of Dandong, and the 
Rajin-Seonbong Special Economic Zone (Raseon) in the North Hamgyeong province, faced 
difficulty in enticing investors due to their remoteness and mismanagement. However, these two 
experiences are still promising, given the growing Chinese interests in North Korean investment. 
Discussions are in progress about the designation of the Nampo port and the outlying Wawoo 
district as a Special District because this area has the advantage of being close to Pyongyang, the 
country’ s major market.  
 
2.1.2 Nampo, fastest growing city of North Korea 
Its proximity to Pyongyang has fostered Nampo’ s growth. Table 1 clearly shows that among North 
Korean cities, Nampo has been the fastest growing since the 1970s, while other cities have 
generally shown a more typical evolution. This illustrates the sudden key importance of Nampo in 
North Korean regional development.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Another aspect of Nampo’ s importance is its role as a gateway, reinforced recently through the 
construction of the new Songgwan terminal in 2001, which is located at the far west end of Nampo 
along the Daedong River. This confirms, in some ways, Bird’ s (1963) model of port evolution, 
showing new port facilities shifting downstream, from the congested river port city’ s inner area, 
to maintain sufficient accessibility. Nampo is constrained by the West Sea Barrage (Figure 1) and 
also by rapid urban growth. However, additional container facilities have been built within the inner 
port using foreign investment (Lloyd's Register, 2006).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In fact, the inner port of Nampo is constrained within a high density (Figure 2). This situation has 
been worsened by the spread of urbanization in the last thirty years, leading to port improvement. 
Songgwan terminal can allow escaping from urban density, with goods bypassing the agglomeration 
via the North, and accessing more easily the newly built factories (e.g. Pyonghwa Automobiles, 
Daean Friendly Glass Factory) as well as Pyongyang, the major market. The high density also 
causes urban sprawl outside of the Nampo central city. Industrial activities have shifted to the 
surrounding areas of Nampo, such as Pyonghwa Automobiles (Figure 2). Such development was 
also justified by the lack of container facilities along the west coast. This confirms that the search 
for economic efficiency has taken precedence over ideological and military considerations (Jo and 
Adler, 2002a).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.2 Ports and the North Korean transport system 
2.2.1 A modal split disfavoring ports 
As a result of the economic crisis which started in the 1970s, the transportation sector has 
stagnated because of the deterioration of infrastructure and the lack of energy, as 70% of power 
generation facilities are severely damaged (Ministry of Unification, 2006).  
The strategy of former president Kim Il-Sung to develop a “ fully integrated and containerized 
transport system”  was favoring land transport rather than ports, although maritime transport was 
given strategic importance in the 7-year Development Plan of 1961, “ to ensure coastal transport, 
expand railway connections and, in particular, improve foreign trade using our ships”  (Ahn, 2003). 
Consequently, port facilities have stagnated except for some investment in oil berths in the 1970s 
and storage facilities in the 1980s. This is reflected in the modal split, similar to the Soviet model: 
73.8% for railways (93% on a ton-kilometer basis), 18.3% for roads and 7.9% for sea transport in 
1989 (Tsuji, 2005). Although it is approximate and should be researched more, recent estimations 
indicate 70% for railways, 17% for roads, 10% for sea transport and 3% for air transport (Roussin 
and Ducruet, 2006). Thus, “ North Korea’ s maritime transportation is relatively poor mainly due 
to its heavy dependence on railway transportation [but] still North Korean roads are 93% unpaved
”  (Bang, 2004). Notably, North Korean ports have suffered from limited foreign trade and the 
deterioration of infrastructure and capital stock (Yoon and Babson, 2002), as well as from military 
considerations, which have hampered commercial and industrial strategies.  
 
2.2.2 High logistic costs at land and sea 
The poor conditions of inland transport tend to isolate ports from their hinterlands, limiting them to 
the local industries, what is partly shown in Figure 3. North Korean regions are disconnected, 
resulting in the imbalance of transport activity: 30% in South Pyongan, 10% in North Pyongan, 24% 
in North Hamgyeong, and 17% in South Hamgyeong (Tsuji, 2005). It is estimated that around 80% of 
North Korean exports pass through Sinuiju. However, there is a hardship to get accurate 
estimations of the volume and modal distribution of border trade.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The main constraint of ports, as observed in other developing countries, is their governance, torn 
between open trade and military affairs. For example, South Korean companies such as the 
state-owned Korea Container Terminal Authority (KCTA), the shipping companies Hansung and 
Kook Yang Shipping have failed to modernize Nampo port through joint ventures for unknown 
reasons (Yonhap News, 2005). In addition, “ the present system of maritime transport presents a 
number of issues, including excessive logistics costs and prolonged shipping time”  (Ahn, 2002). A 
round trip between Incheon and Nampo takes 24 hours for 100 kilometers and costs as much as the 
route to Europe, US$1,000 for one TEU (Ahn, 2001), although this cost is said to have fallen to 
US$250 in recent years (Choe et al., 2005). Moreover, North Korea still collects exorbitant 
port-entry fees, and the Korean companies involved in processing trade spend 40% of their 
manufacturing costs on logistics. Since 45% of containers sent to the North return empty 
(Forster-Carter, 2001), freight charges between North and South Korea are higher than other 
routes to China. 
 
3. NAMPO AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN PORT SYSTEM 
The question of the relevancy of Soviet and socialist developing country models can be answered 
by looking at the evolution of maritime activity on national and local scales.  
 
3.1 The persistence of the Soviet model 
3.1.1 A parallel evolution of shipping and trade 
First, it is possible to highlight the evolution of North Korean maritime activity by using the cargo 
vessel movements of all registered seagoing vessels over 100 gross tons, provided by Lloyd’ s 
Marine Intelligence Unit, the world ’ s major source for shipping information. However, the 
summation of the capacity of the ships calling to North Korea might not always match the real 
amount of loaded and unloaded cargo. As showed in Figure 4, the highest sea trade activity 
(1985-1987) marks the heyday of DPRK, with a growing foreign trade until 1988. The impact of the 
USSR collapse is visible from 1991, together with the period of isolation and stagnation 
(1992-1999), the recent openness towards South Korea after the June 2000 summit and the 
reforms of 2002 (2000-2005). Then, like post-soviet countries, economy was struck hard and 
faced difficult recovery in a context of globalization.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
An estimation of the share of sea trade is proposed, using a ton-dollar ratio of $US 250 by 
deadweight ton. This ratio is based on the comparison of total and sea trade with Japan and South 
Korea, for which maritime transport is dominant. Specific trends are better illustrated, such as the 
cuts in oil shipments from Russia (1985-1988), the Rajin-Seonbong free-trade zone experiment 
(1991-1992), the sustained trade with Japan at the time of isolation (1993-1997), humanitarian aid 
(1998-2002), and the rise of trade with China by land from 2003.  
 
3.1.2 The limited importance of maritime trade 
According to the estimation, the average share of trade by sea is 26.7% over the period, almost 
one-third of total foreign trade. This has increased from 23% (1985-1990) to 25% (1991-1997) and 
again to 30% (1998-2005), indicating that maritime transportation in North Korea may have been 
largely underestimated. However, the value of the cargo is not fixed and varies according to the 
products shipped. In order to adjust the total tonnage to the value of the goods, the method of “
weighted tonnage”  proposed by Charlier (1994) for European ports can be applied. Because 
container handling facilities lack in North Korea (Kim, 2005), container and roll-on/roll-off traffic is 
chosen for reference as it is the most technologically advanced. Other traffics are adjusted with a 
reducing coefficient of twelve for oil, nine for other liquid bulk, six for solid bulk, and three for 
general cargo. When transferred to dollars, the share of maritime trade is only 7% on an average 
basis, oscillating between 10 and 20 percent. Thus, North Korea can be said to still follow the 
Soviet model of transportation, with reduced importance of ports and maritime trade.  
 
3.1.3 The preference to socialist trade and bulky products 
Another aspect of the Soviet model is preferential trade with countries of the same political family, 
i.e. within socialist countries. This was particularly true for North Korea although the share of 
socialist countries in total trade has decreased from 100% in 1955 to 78% in 1970 and 70% in 1985, 
while the share of capitalist countries has increased from 4% in 1960 to 20% in 1985, and the share 
of developing countries has increased from 2.5% in 1970 to almost 10% in 1985 (Hughes, 1999). 
According to maritime linkages (Table 2), the importance of socialist countries (i.e. China, Russia, 
and Vietnam) is quite low along the period. However, the figure is distorted because of the data 
source, which only provides vessel movements for the first port of call before and after North 
Korea. For example, the importance of Singapore and Taiwan comes from their relay functions for 
most vessels passing through the Malacca Strait. Goods may be shipped to and from other 
destinations through these hubs. Also, this might reflect that Chinese and Russian trade occur 
mostly by land transport through the border areas. In addition, although trade in 2004 with Thailand 
(8.1%), India (3.8%), and Europe (7%) is substantial, their share by sea is under one percent. South 
Korea has replaced Japan as the main partner since 2003. The main trend is a growing spatial 
contraction of distance, because of ageing North Korean fleet and increased isolation from the 
world economy.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In terms of the goods shipped, the dominance of general cargo (also defined as 'miscellaneous 
goods') can be explained by the limited importance of oil shipments (Figure 5). During the collapse 
of USSR, oil shipments have stopped, but their increase between 1998 and 2004 is caused by 
humanitarian aid and Chinese support. Liquid and solid bulks together occupy half of the shipments, 
with 45,6% on an average basis. As a result, manufactured goods oscillate between 1% and 6% only 
along the period, with no noticeable increase. From this analysis, it is possible to assess the 
persistence of a Soviet model both in terms of modal split, goods transported and trade 
relationships, as North Korean sea transport does not give sufficient clue of its shift to developing 
or transition country trends. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
3.2 Nampo case and the developing country model 
3.2.1 A limited port concentration 
A common feature of developing countries is to concentrate most of their trade activity in one main 
load centre, which is the interface between the country’ s core region and the world. Such trend 
often results in congestion problems for the port and the adjacent city, along with the decline or 
disappearance of smaller ports, because of land transport limitations with the core region and lack 
of investment (Taaffe et al., 1963). Table 3 gives an overlook of this phenomenon, where island 
ports have been excluded due to obvious geographical factors. Values over 100 indicate the 
importance of transshipment for some ports. In most cases, the share of national seaborne trade has 
increased between 1990 and 2000, or has remained stable at high values.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Although Nampo is the natural gateway of Pyongyang, North Korea’ s primate city and core region 
(Jo and Adler, 2002), its share in the country’ s maritime activity has been irregular over the last 
two decades (Figure 6). The importance of other main trading ports is around 40% on an average 
basis. Thus, North Korean maritime activity has been maintained outside the core region, probably 
because of the sustain of Russian and Japanese trade for the East coast. In fact, Nampo has reached 
over 50% of maritime trade only between 1997 and 1998 and between 2003 and 2004, while it has 
exceeded 20% of total trade only in 1998 and 1999, with only 5% when adjusted to weighted tons. 
This confirms the importance of border trade by land transport rather than the importance of other 
ports.   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.2.2 A growing port concentration 
Although the different estimations of the importance of Nampo are low, the trend of concentration 
has an average annual growth rate of 3.8% over the period. Furthermore, the traffic of East coast 
ports is inflated by humanitarian aid. Another possibility is to distinguish between the concentration 
of types of goods (Figure 7). Although Nampo was not the main port of North Korea until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, it has concentrated most commodities since 1994, except for liquid 
bulks. Especially, the concentration of container traffic reveals an important trend of developing 
countries, which is the predominance of one port for modern berthing infrastructures and 
normalized handling facilities. This is notably true after the creation of the new Songgwan terminal 
in 2001. Thus, Nampo has become North Korea’ s load centre for the most valuable goods (general 
cargo, containers). The decrease of humanitarian shipments and the worsening diplomatic 
relationships with the outside world might reinforce this trend, as East coast ports might not be able 
to keep the pace, cut from both the core region and the traditional partners. Still, a number of stakes 
remain to be overcome, such the integration of Nampo in a larger logistic chain at the scale of the 
Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia and the world.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. THE FUTURE OF NAMPO AS NORTH KOREAN GATEWAY 
 
4.1 Port connection to the transport chain 
The particular location of North Korea is definitely an advantage, but its limited openness hampers 
the trade relationships among its neighbours. As a result, South Korea is an island with 99% of its 
trade occurring by sea. Studies on Northeast Asian transportation give very diverse views on the 
role of North Korean ports. For example, Kovrigin (2002) praises the “ new silk road”  running 
east through Rajin as it would lower the delivery time and cost from South Korea to Europe by 50 
percent and 30 percent, respectively. Gao et al. (2005) lower the importance of a trans-Korean land 
bridge and are more optimistic about future growth in the Tumen area. Inversely, the Ministry of 
Unification in South Korea (2006) is very optimistic about future Korean trade passing through 
North Korea by land.  
In fact, North Korean ports are diversely positioned within the transport chain. For example, China 
plans to develop the Rajin port after North Korea leases the second pier for 50 years in order to 
facilitate the import and export of goods to North China directly by sea (Cotton, 1996). The creation 
of a logistics free-zone in Namyang, Onsong County, at the border along the Tumen River, is a 
complementary node for inter-firm cooperation among Japanese, South Korean and Chinese 
companies located in Jilin province (Hankyoreh, 2006). The ongoing improvement of the link 
between Rajin and Hunchen, China, shall reduce frequent truck accidents in this region (Tsuji, 
2004). Also, Rajin is well located for Japanese transit trade, as the shortest and cheapest path 
between Japan and the continent. However, such potentials are not yet fully reflected in recent 
traffic figures (Figure 8), although one can notice a slight increase since 2003. Still, there is a 
possibility to become a gateway for Northeast Asia, but low population and economic activities, as 
well as distance to Pyongyang, are constraining Rajin's function as North Korea's gateway.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Comparatively, Nampo is better connected to land infrastructure, with the 10-lane highway to 
Pyongyang that continues, with a lower technical quality, to Gaeseong and Wonsan. However, the 
transport chain is limited to Pyongyang until roads are improved in this country, notably near Sinuiju 
to the north and towards the Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC) to the south. Political factors are 
more important in this case than economical ones. Internally, the North Korean government gives 
priority to the railway network, because the road network is wider, more costly and less adapted to 
carry the goods generated by mines and heavy industry. Furthermore, the government intends to 
limit road transport in order to better control circulation flows, to limit the budget expenses for 
buying vehicles and oil, as well as to protect the environment. Externally, the trade embargo 
decided by the Wassenaar Agreement in 1996 does not allow North Korean goods to be exported 
directly from this country. This harms the usage of western ports such as Haeju and Nampo to 
exporting finished products. Instead, semi-finished goods are sent to South Korea from GIC despite 
land transport hardships and logistic costs through the DMZ. For Wonsan, travel conditions are not 
perfect due to frequent tunnel obstruction and poor road quality. Thus, huge gaps between South 
and North Korean transportation systems are hampering their fruitful cooperation of land 
transportation (Kim, 2006).  
 
4.2 Ports and special economic zones 
When inland transportation lacks, economic development is still possible when investment is made 
around the port area. The usual strategy is to build free-trade zones adjacent to ports, such as 
Kaohsiung in Taiwan in 1966, Masan in South Korea in 1970, Shenzhen in China in 1978, and so on. 
This trend is not limited to formerly developing Asian countries, but also applies in transition 
countries, and the interplay of ports and local industrial development for export and transit trade 
has been an important strategy to support the shift from a socialist to a market economy, coping 
with infrastructure hardships. The subject is too wide to be covered in this paper, so a comparison 
between Baltic and North Korean ports is provided (Figure 9).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
This clearly shows the fact that Nampo is the only port comparable to Baltic ports, given the pattern 
of traffic evolution and a better recovery than other North Korean ports since the late 1990s. North 
Korean ports were more dynamic 20 years ago, while Baltic ports have reached their highest 
activity recently, well beyond their former activity under the Soviet rule. Baltic ports could profit 
from the lack of major topographical obstacles for transport infrastructure and their intermediate 
position between Russia and Western Europe (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Moreover, the 
difficulty accessing the continent by railways, due to differences in track gauges, increases the 
importance of maritime transport (Spens et al., 2004; Kovacs and Spens, 2006). This is reflected in 
the creation of industrial parks around port areas and the liberalization of ports following the 
economic reforms, as seen with the Muuga Free Port and Sillamae Industrial Area in Estonia (since 
1997), Riga and Ventspils Free Ports and Liepaia SEZ in Latvia (since 2002) and the Klaipeda FTZ 
and Business Park in Lithuania (since 1995).  
Although North Korean port activity is comparatively inconsistent, the experiment of 
Rajin-Seonbong had immediate and strong effects on maritime trade in the early 1990s, as shown in 
Figure 7. Its port activity quadrupled in 1992, and such a growth is not yet achieved for the Baltic 
ports. This means that the potentials of North Korean ports can be rapid and enormous. The relative 
failure of the Rajin-Seonbong experiment was, in fact, determined by an unfavourable context – the 
zone was conceived too early – but recent Chinese interest in the development of the area is 
promising. As shown on the Figure 7, the port has rejuvenated within only two or three years, 
despite the limitations of land transport. That is, the betterment of demand and infrastructure shall 
make this free-zone more successful, based on transshipment rather than national trade. One can 
imagine in this context that the implementation of a new free-zone around Nampo, which is better 
connected to a larger and closer hinterland, can be a successful case on a longer term. This might 
explain the highest importance given to Nampo in terms of cost for developing infrastructures and 
special economic zone (US$ 822 million), compared to other strategic areas like Rajin (US$ 614 
million), Wonsan (US$ 575 million), Gaeseong (US$ 544 million), Sinuiju (US$ 495 million), and 
Mount Geumgang (US$ 206 million) (Lee et al. 2004).  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Although Jo (2000) analyzed the evolution of urban and regional planning issues through the theory 
of the socialist developing countries, the North Korean maritime transportation appears to be 
somewhere between the Soviet model and the socialist developing country model. On one side, the 
evolution of North Korean maritime transportation has verified the Soviet model, with the moderate 
share of seaborne activity, the little importance of manufactured goods, and the spatial contraction 
of its maritime networks to its closest partners. On the other side, the evolution of Nampo has 
confirmed some aspects of the socialist developing country model, such as port concentration and 
modernization. Thus, Nampo is likely to follow the trend of socialist developing countries, i.e. to 
become the main load centre of the country, dedicated to the close core region of Pyongyang.  
This paper is the first time that maritime transport in North Korea is analyzed, based on first-hand 
data from Lloyd's group about vessel traffic by product and by trading partner. Once other usual 
sources such as KOTRA (Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency) or JETRO (Japan External 
Trade Organization) are limited to national-level figures, previous studies of North Korean 
maritime trade have been limited in providing realistic measures of port activities (Kim et al, 1998), 
but this study could bring a micro perspective. Thus, this paper provides a base upon which further 
studies of North Korean trade and ports shall be carried. Finally, proposed measurements are not 
perfect. Though this paper provided a quantitative approach to the question of the modal split in 
North Korean trade, it is not enough to explain the share of sea trade among total trade. Further 
research should include the additional border trade by transport means (i.e. rail and road) and type 
of goods.  
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Table 1: Evolution of urban population in North Korean cities (Unit: 000s inhabitants) 
City Province 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 1960s 1940s 1930s 1920s 
Pyongyang Pyongyang 2,992 2,741 2,355 1,500 840 388 235 120 
Hamheung South Hamgyeong 821 709 670 489 424 112 64 32 
Cheongjin North Hamgyeong 674 582 520 407 265 198 72 - 
Nampo South Pyongan 655 566 370 163 140 69 62 31 
Sinuiju North Pyongan 377 342 500 300 300 61 59 16 
Heungnam South Hamgyeong 349 - - 260 150 144 - - 
Wonsan Gangwon 347 308 398 350 275 79 67 37 
Gaeseong North Hwanghae 341 334 310 240 175 75 54 45 
Sariwon North Hwanghae 294 254 230 136 85 43 - - 
Haeju South Hwanghae 265 240 213 163 140 63 30 15 
Kanggyae Chagangdo 258 234 211 163 130 26 - - 
Kimchaek North Hamgyeong 227 - 281 265 265 62 - - 
Hyaesan Yanggang 206 178 160 136 85 16 - - 
Songrim North Hwanghae 153 102 108 96 85 53 - 13 
Sinpo South Hamgyeong 77 - 158 - 165 35 - - 
 
Sources: Jo and Adler, 2002b; Helders, 2006; Lahmeyer, 2006 
 
 
Table 2: Evolution of North Korean maritime linkages, 1985-2005 (Unit: % DWT) 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Indonesia 0,1 0,5 0,9 0,4 0,6 0,7 0,2 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,5 1,0 2,0 2,3 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,2 0,2 0,1 
India 0,0 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,7 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 1,0 0,6 0,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,7 
Malaysia 0,1 0,4 0,1 0,2 0,7 0,9 1,0 0,5 0,6 0,4 0,3 3,1 0,9 1,5 1,4 0,3 1,4 0,5 2,1 0,6 0,0 
Philippines 0,1 0,4 0,6 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,4 0,8 0,0 1,1 0,0 1,0 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,6 0,1 0,9 0,0 
Singapore 14,4 14,6 13,4 12,1 15,4 11,2 8,9 6,1 7,5 5,1 6,2 5,2 8,6 9,1 8,6 4,1 13,4 4,5 3,6 0,3 1,4 
Thailand 1,1 1,4 0,9 1,2 0,8 1,0 4,0 1,9 1,2 0,3 0,3 0,3 1,7 0,4 0,6 1,4 0,6 0,9 0,1 0,4 0,2 
Taiwan 0,6 2,3 0,3 0,6 0,5 0,8 1,3 2,3 3,7 3,7 0,3 2,7 4,3 2,1 5,1 2,1 7,6 6,9 5,5 6,4 3,2 
Vietnam 0,6 0,3 0,5 1,2 0,0 1,6 0,4 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,0 0,6 0,6 0,0 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,1 
Other S&E Asia 3,9 0,9 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,8 0,6 0,0 0,9 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,7 0,0 0,0 0,1 
Sub-total S&E Asia 21,0 21,1 17,2 16,5 19,0 17,1 16,3 12,1 13,9 11,7 9,2 14,6 18,4 16,4 19,5 8,5 23,4 14,6 11,8 8,8 5,7 
China 13,7 16,5 20,8 24,9 28,8 24,2 21,1 19,0 24,9 22,3 19,9 27,6 25,2 16,3 11,3 10,5 6,2 14,3 20,9 12,4 11,4 
Japan 37,9 46,5 41,5 48,1 39,3 44,7 44,8 53,1 41,6 48,6 38,4 36,4 36,8 42,6 21,5 27,0 33,6 35,2 20,1 18,0 12,2 
South Korea 20,5 6,6 11,1 0,4 3,5 5,8 5,5 10,1 8,2 5,0 21,6 2,4 7,9 11,9 24,0 21,9 18,5 17,9 28,6 51,8 53,2 
North Korea (domestic) 0,9 0,9 0,3 0,8 0,8 2,0 2,1 0,0 0,9 1,0 1,5 0,3 1,3 1,4 1,1 1,3 1,8 0,2 0,9 0,1 0,1 
Russia / Far East 0,3 1,4 1,5 1,0 0,1 0,4 0,4 0,8 5,7 0,6 0,7 5,2 4,4 7,5 9,7 12,5 13,5 17,4 14,8 3,4 2,8 
Sub-total Northeast Asia 73,3 71,9 75,3 75,2 72,4 77,1 74,0 83,0 81,2 77,5 82,0 71,8 75,6 79,8 67,6 73,3 73,5 85,0 85,3 85,7 79,6 
Canada 0,6 0,7 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 3,0 1,1 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,6 0,0 0,0 1,2 0,3 
USA 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,0 1,1 0,0 3,3 0,6 1,8 0,8 0,0 0,4 0,0 3,2 4,2 3,7 1,2 0,0 1,3 1,0 0,3 
Panama / Latin America 1,0 0,9 0,9 2,1 1,2 1,2 0,8 0,7 1,1 0,8 1,4 1,9 1,1 0,0 4,1 0,5 0,9 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Oceania 0,9 1,3 4,0 1,9 3,7 1,9 2,4 2,0 0,0 3,9 7,4 8,2 1,4 0,0 1,2 10,4 0,0 0,0 1,2 2,0 10,2 
Middle-East 3,1 3,9 2,2 4,0 2,5 2,7 0,0 0,6 1,1 5,2 0,0 2,9 3,3 0,6 3,4 0,4 0,4 0,1 0,3 1,2 3,9 
Others 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 
Sub-total rest of world 5,7 7,0 7,4 8,3 8,6 5,9 9,7 4,9 4,9 10,8 8,8 13,6 6,0 3,8 13,0 18,3 3,1 0,4 2,8 5,5 14,7 
Sub-total socialist 14,6 18,2 22,8 27,1 28,9 26,2 21,9 19,8 30,7 23,2 20,6 33,4 30,2 23,8 21,6 23,5 20,1 31,7 36,0 15,8 14,3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Port concentration in developing and transition countries, 1990 and 2000 
(Unit: % of national seaborne trade) 
Country Main port (a) Main city (b) 
Road distance (km)  
from (a) to (b) 
1990 2000 
Jordan Aqaba Amman 300 677 504 
Djibouti Djibouti Djibouti 0 108 390 
Togo Lome Lome 0 120 207 
Myanmar Yangon Yangon 0 279 173 
Benin Cotonou Cotonou 0 83 148 
Bahrain Mina Sulman Manama 0 24 141 
Romania Constantza Bucharest 260 172 139 
Estonia Tallinn Tallinn 0 N/A 123 
Bangladesh Chittagong Dhaka 460 75 120 
Ghana Tema Accra 26 63 115 
Latvia Riga Riga 0 N/A 111 
Namibia Walvis Bay Windhoek 300 95 105 
French Guiana Degrad-des-Cannes Cayenne 46 347 103 
Cote D'ivoire Abidjan Abidjan 0 102 102 
El Salvador Acajutla San Salvador 28 96 102 
Senegal Dakar Dakar 0 104 101 
Kenya Mombasa Nairobi 500 93 100 
Cameroon Douala Douala 0 27 100 
Lebanon Beirut Beirut 0 79 100 
Guinea Conakry Conakry 0 38 100 
Gambia Banjul Banjul 0 97 100 
Brunei Darussalam Muara Bandar Seri Begawan 15 77 99 
Eritrea Massawa Asmara 70 23 95 
Cambodia Sihanoukville Phnom Penh 214 N/A 91 
Costa Rica Puerto Limon San Jose 142 129 91 
Honduras Puerto Cortes Tegucigalpa 242 110 90 
United Arab Emirates Dubai Dubai 0 18 89 
Philippines Manila Manila 0 38 85 
Sudan Port Sudan Khartoum 800 74 73 
Peru Callao Lima 30 182 70 
Pakistan Karachi Karachi 0 116 70 
Bulgaria Bourgas Sofia 400 41 69 
Malaysia Port Klang Kuala Lumpur 42 33 64 
Saudi Arabia Jeddah Riyadh 1000 7 61 
North Korea Nampo Pyongyang 40 37 59 
Mozambique Maputo Maputo 0 43 58 
Ghana Takoradi Accra 200 28 57 
Tanzania Dar-es-Salaam Dodoma 460 94 55 
Guatemala Puerto Quetzal Guatemala City 257 28 55 
Nicaragua Corinto Managua 42 29 54 
 
Source: Ducruet, 2004 
(1) values for Nampo are for 1994 and 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Location map of Nampo until 2004 
Source: authors 
 
 
Figure 2: Urbanization and land-use in the port city of Nampo 
 
 
Sources: Atlas of North Korea, 1997; Google, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Travel time and cost by truck from Pyongyang to main cities 
 
Sources: World Food Programme, 2000; Helders, 2006; Korea Strategic Data, 2006 
(1) This company cooperates with a French freight forwarder in Pyongyang, North Korea. With their permission, this real 
travel time and cost can be provided. Since this real time and cost reflect current situation of trucking in North Korea, 
estimated time will be different depending on rehabilitation of infrastructure and institutional improvement. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Sea trade importance in total trade, 1985-2005 
  
Sources: Ministry of Unification, 2006; Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit, 2006 
(1) DWT: Deadweight Tonnage, summed from the capacity of the vessels 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Sea trade evolution by product, 1985-2006 (Unit: % DWT) 
 
Sources: Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit, 2006 
 
 
Figure 6: Trade concentration in Nampo, 1985-2005 (Unit: %) 
  
Sources: Ministry of Unification, 2006; Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit, 2006 
(1) Figures for 2006 end in August 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Trade concentration in Nampo by product, 1985-2005 (Unit: % DWT) 
 
 
 
Source: Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit, 2006 
(1) bold values are those superior to the period's average 
 
 
Figure 8: Port traffic evolution in Rajin, 1985-2005 
 
Source: Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit, 2006 
(1) TEUs: Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units, the standard measurement for container traffics 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Port traffic evolution in Baltic and North Korean ports, 1989-2005 
(Unit: million metric tons) 
 
 
Source: Serry, 2006; Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit, 2006 
(1) deadweight tons have been adjusted to metric tons by using the official conversion coefficient of 1.016047 
(2) bold values are those superior to the period's average 
